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THE MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE: AMMUNITION FOR THE WAR
ON TRASH
JOHN L. BROWNLEE*
I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of garbage disposal in America has reached a critical
stage. Americans throw away 179.6 million tons of garbage per year.'
People in this country generate more garbage per capita than in any other
nation.2 The amount of garbage generated annually in the United States
has risen eighty percent since 1960,' and the current projection is that
Americans will produce 216 million tons of garbage in the year 2000.4
During the last two decades, state and local governments have tried
to find places to dispose of their share of the nearly 180 million tons of
garbage produced annually in the United States. Faced with landfill
closings, local opposition to siting new landfills, and environmental
restrictions, states have searched beyond their geographic boundaries for
disposal sites. More than fifteen million tons of garbage cross state lines
each year.5 In response, state and local jurisdictions with adequate

* B.S. in Business Administration and Accounting, Washington and Lee University,
1987; M.B.A. in Management, Golden Gate University, 1990; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School

of Law, College of William and Mary, expected 1994.
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes garbage as "bottles, cans,
disposable diapers, uneaten food, scraps of wood and metal, worn-out tires and used-up
batteries, paper and plastic packages, boxes, broken furniture and appliances, clippings
from lawn and shrubs - the varied human refuse of our modem industrial society." THE
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE
SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 6 (1989) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR
ACTION]. Garbage constitutes merely a part of what is referred to technically as solid
waste which according to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 includes
"any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant,
or air pollution control facility and other discarded material." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)
(1988).
2. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 8.
3. Casey Bukro, East's GarbageFilling Heartland,CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 1989, at 1.
4. Don Phillips, ContainersMask Cargo as TrainsRoll PastD.C., WASH. POST, Dec. 22,

1991, at Al (reporting EPA estimate).
5. See Shipping Out the Trash, 18 ENVTL. FORUM, No. 5, at 28 (1991) (stating that it is
often cheaper to haul waste long distances than to dispose of it locally). Interstate
transportation of solid waste appears to have increased. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT
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disposal capacity have banned waste generated outside their jurisdictions.
States, struggling to plan for and accommodate their own solid waste, have
attempted to use their regulatory
powers to stop or slow the flow of waste
6
impor ed to their landfills.
Landfills, where approximately eighty percent of the nation's
garbage is deposited, are the most widely used method for disposal of
municipal solid waste.7 Because of this heavy reliance on landfills, the
amount of available landfill space in the nation has decreased dramatically
in recent years. Estimates show that one-third of the existing landfills will
be closed in two years and that eighty percent will be full within twenty
years.8 The failure to make long-term plans has left some states with
inadequate existing landfill space, 9 and other states, which currently have
sufficient landfill capacity, with an intensifying desire to protect their
limited landfill resources.1"
This Article argues that the better solution to the garbage disposal
crisis is to allow courts to use the market participant doctrine to determine
the constitutionality of state waste import restrictions. The market
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause would permit states
that operate and control solid waste landfills to reject the importation of
out-of-state waste. The implementation of the market participant exception
NEXT FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE? 1 (1989)
TRASH].

at 274-75 [hereinafter FACING AMERICA'S

6. States must take circuitous routes to avoid violating the Commerce Clause if they wish
to protect instate disposal capacity by preventing the importing of waste. See Stephen M.
Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DICK. L. REV. 131 (1990)
(discussing Pennsylvania's efforts to slow the flow of waste to its limited landfill space).
7. AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 1, at 15. By comparison, only ten percent of the
nation's garbage is recycled and ten percent incinerated. Id. More recent statistics indicate
that this ration may be improving slightly. Mariette DiChristina, How We Can Win the
War Against Garbage, POPULAR SCI., Oct. 1990, at 57 (seventy-three percent of
America's trash is disposed in landfills; thirteen percent is recycled and fourteen percent
is incinerated).
8. FACING AMERICA'S TRASH, supra note 5, at 1; DiChristina, supra note 7, at 57.
9. The northeastern states, particularly New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, suffer
from severe shortages of landfill space. Jonathan Phillip Byers, Now Entering the Age
of NIMBY, 21 WASTE AGE 36, 37 (1990) (NIMBY is the acronym for "not in my
backyard").
10. See Landfill Growth. Interstate Trash Movement Generate Clashes at County
Official's Meetings, 19 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2365 (Mar. 10, 1989)(midwestem county
officials, at the annual legislative conference of the National Association of Counties,
voiced concern over eastern states' increasing reliance on privately owned landfills in the
Midwest).
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would allow states with adequate landfill capacity to plan properly for the
disposal of their municipal solid waste, and force those states which rely
heavily on the exportation of their garbage to develop alternative
mechanisms to manage their own waste disposal problems.
Part I of this Article examines the history of the Commerce Clause
and analyzes how the Commerce Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause have affected certain solid waste legislation. Part II examines the
market participant doctrine and reviews how the United States Supreme
Court has implemented and interpreted the doctrine. In Part III, the Article
discusses three cases in which the courts have used the market participant
doctrine to allow states to restrict the importation of out-of-state waste.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND RESTRICTIONS ON STATES'
REGULATORY POWERS

The Constitution specifically grants to Congress the power to
regulate commerce.1" The primary purpose of the Commerce Clause is
to ensure cooperation among the states in the area of interstate trade.1
The Framers designed the Commerce Clause to keep commerce moving
freely among the states, and thereby guard against the economic
Balkanization that plagued the Colonies and the United States under the
Articles of Confederation. 3 Although the Constitution does not define
commerce, the United States Supreme Court has read the term broadly,
and today commerce includes virtually all commercial transactions. 4
The Constitution's grant of power to Congress over commerce,

11. "The Congress shall have the power to... regulate Commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
13. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states retained the power to regulate
interstate commerce, resulting in the individual states discriminating against their
neighbors in order to benefit their own citizens. THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander

Hamilton), No. 47 (James Madison); David Pomper, Comment, Recycling City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, PostindustrialNatural
Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (1989).

The

Commerce Clause "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must
sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and
not division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).

14. Commerce is the "exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the
buying, selling, and exchanging of articles." Anderson v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,
74 S.E.2d 415, 417 (Ga. 1970).
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unlike the power to levy customs duties 5 and the power to raise
armies, 6 is unaccompanied by correlative restrictions on state
power.' 7 This distinction does not, however, of itself, signify that the
states are expected to participate in the power granted Congress, subject
only to the operation of the Supremacy Clause. As Alexander Hamilton
noted, "while some of the powers which are vested in the national
government admit of their 'concurrent' exercise by the States, others are
of their very nature 'exclusive,' and hence render the notion of a like
power in the States 'contradictory and repugnant."'' 8 The power of
Congress to promote interstate commerce includes the power to regulate
the local movement of goods traveling in both the state of origin and
the state of destination.' 9 The language of the Commerce Clause
explicitly grants power to Congress, and the Supreme Court has
recognized that this grant of power implicitly limits the authority of the
states in the area of interstate commerce. 20 The limitation placed on
the states is the dormant Commerce Clause."
The text of the Commerce Clause provides no overt restraint of
state impingement on interstate commerce, and Congress has been silent
on the issue. Consequently, the Supreme Court has had to interpret the
extent to which self-executing limitations on the scope of permissible
state regulation are inherent in the Constitution's affirmative grant of
power. Absent a dormant Commerce Clause, if Congress had not
legislated on a particular matter, states would be free to enact legislation
favoring local commerce and limiting the rights of other states in
commercial transactions.22 More specifically, the dormant Commerce

15. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.

16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
17. See supra note 11.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
19. See generally Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264

(1981).
20. See C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326
(1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53

U.S. 299 (1852).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L.
REV. 563 (1983); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF FEDERALISM, 1987 DUKE LJ. 569

(1987).
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Clause operates to ensure that states acting as independent and selfinterested economic actors will not jeopardize our nation's economic
system and freedom in interstate trade.23
A. Gibbons v. Ogden: The Supreme Court Interprets Congressional
Silence
The New York legislature enacted a statute granting Robert
Fulton and Robert Livingston the exclusive right to operate steamboats
in New York waters.2 The statute was designed to encourage
investment in the development of steamboat technology. 26 Fulton and
Livingston licensed Ogden to operate a ferry between New York City
and Elizabethtown Point in New Jersey.' Gibbons began operating a
competing ferry system that, because it necessarily entered New York
waters, violated the grant to Fulton and Livingston, and the license to
Ogden.' Gibbons' ferries were licensed as "vessels [in] the coasting
trade" under a statute enacted by Congress in 1793.29 Ogden obtained
an injunction against Gibbons from the New York courts.30
Chief Justice John Marshall found the New York monopoly
invalid because it conflicted with the federal commerce power.3
Gibbons argued that the federal commerce power was exclusive; that is,
that the states had no right to take any action which affected interstate
commerce.3 2 The Chief Justice conceded that the argument had "great
force," and that he was "not satisfied that the argument had been
refuted 33 but avoided an explicit ruling on the argument. The Court
assumed, without deciding, that the states could regulate commerce in a
particular way if no actual conflict existed between the state regulation
and an act of Congress.' The Court then found that an actual conflict

23. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
24. 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1 (1824).

Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 209.
34. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat) 1, 210 (1824).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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between New York's action and a law of Congress was present.35 The
federal licensing law conflicted with the New York monopoly, and the
New York monopoly had to fall under the Supremacy Clause.36
A few years after Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall appeared to
concede that a state sometimes could affect interstate commerce as an
incidental consequence of the exercise of its police powers. In Willson
v. Black Bird Creek March Company,37 the state of Delaware had
authorized the construction of a dam on a creek which flowed into the
Delaware River.38 Because the dam blocked navigation of the creek,
the owners of a federally licensed ship broke the dam in order to pass
through the creek, and were sued by the dam's owners. 39 The Court
ruled in favor of the dam's owner.4" The Chief Justice retreated from
his position in Gibbons that congressional licensing of a vessel
constituted congressional action which was specifically in conflict with
a state's attempt to regulate the use of its waterways. 41 Marshall
concluded in Willson that no actual conflict arose between Delaware's
permitting the dam and any act of Congress, and further, that
Delaware's action was not "repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state."42 The Court reasoned that Delaware
intended to protect the health of nearby inhabitants rather than regulate
interstate commerce.43 This holding seemed to imply that the Court
would not normally construe a state's attempt to regulate health
concerns as interfering with the dormant federal commerce power.'
B. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey": Environmental Concerns
and the Dormant Commerce Clause
In response to the use of New Jersey landfills for disposal of
waste from cities in Pennsylvania and New York, the New Jersey
legislature, in 1974, enacted a statute prohibiting the importation of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 210.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 252.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat) 1, 221 (1824).
Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252.
Id. at 251.
44. Id.
45. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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nonhazardous solid or liquid waste into the state.46 Several New
Jersey operators and out-of-state users of the landfill sites challenged
on the ground that it discriminated against interstate
the statute 47
commerce.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute as violative of the
Commerce Clause. 48 The majority concluded that the law was
"basically a protectionist measure," rather than a way of resolving
legitimate local concerns. 49 The State's chosen means, not its asserted
purposes, controlled the Court's decision. ° The Court declined to
decide whether the main purpose of the statute was to protect the state's
environment and its inhabitants' health and safety or to stabilize the
costs of waste disposal for New Jersey residents at the expense of outof-state interests.51 It was unnecessary to decide this issue because
"the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as
legislative ends. 52 Because New Jersey had chosen discriminatory
methods to further its objectives, the statute represented a protectionist
measure. 3 The Court held that the New Jersey statute "impose[d] on
out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the
State's remaining landfill space ... [and constituted an] attempt by one
State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a
barrier against the movement of interstate trade."
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that the state legislature had
articulated valid concerns regarding the threats to the health and safety
of citizens caused by landfills.55 The Supreme Court and lower federal
courts wrongly had permitted the states' despite the resulting incidental
burden on interstate commerce. 6 Justice Rehnquist argued that
''quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist
measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

618, 625.
619.
629.
624.

50. Id. at 626.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 632.
Id.at 631.
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commerce."57 By invalidating the statute, the Court placed New Jersey
in a precarious position. Justice Rehnquist commented on the
unenviable position of the New Jersey legislature.
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations,
leaving itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent
solution to the serious problem of disposing of the waste
generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste
from every portion of the United States, thereby
multiplying the health and safety problems which would
result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within
the State.5"
The majority in City of Philadelphiastuck down the New Jersey
law because it erected a "barrier against the movement of interstate
trade" without any rational justification for treating out-of-state waste
differently from in-state waste.59 The Court supported its position by
referring to cases holding that a "[sitate is without power to prevent
privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in
interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local
demands or because they are needed by the people of the State."'
This basic principle, coupled with the disclaimer in footnote number
six, 6 acknowledged the market participant exception and left open the

possibility that states might in some instances be able to restrict access
62
to state-owned resources.

C. Municipal Solid Waste and Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The general public, concerned by news of environmental
disasters such as Love Canal and Times Beach, has become aggressive
in its opposition to sitting solid waste landfills. 63 "Behind the public
57.

Id.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 628.
60. Id. at 627 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10
(1928)).
61. "We express no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources." Id. at 627 n.6.
62. Id. at 627.

63. Robert H. Abrams, Keeping Out Non-Local Garbage:An End Around the
Dormant Commerce Clause?, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 340 (1991-92).
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outcry lie genuine environmental and public health concerns,
traditionally areas of regulation lying near the heart of the states' police
power."' In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources,65 the United States Supreme Court
found that a Michigan statute discriminated impermissibly against
interstate commerce. Rather than creating a single statewide plan, the
Michigan statutory provisions required each county to adopt a solid
waste management plan.66 The act prohibited landfill operators from
accepting solid waste generated outside of the county in which they
were located unless the county plan explicitly authorized such
acceptance. 67 The Court held that the Michigan law illegally
discriminated against intrastate counties as well as other states.68
In 1978 the Michigan legislature passed the Solid Waste
Management Act (SWMA) which required every county in the state to
gauge the amount of solid waste that it would generate in the next
twenty years and to adopt a plan for disposal of the waste at facilities
that complied with Michigan health standards.69 After holding public
hearings and obtaining the necessary approval from municipalities in St.
Clair County and from the Director of the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources (the Department), the County Board of
Commissioners adopted a solid waste management plan.70 In 1987 the
Department issued a permit to the plaintiff, to operate a sanitary landfill
as a solid waste disposal area.71 On December 28, 1988, the Michigan
legislature amended the SWMA by adding two provisions prohibiting
the acceptance of solid waste that was not generated in the county in
which the disposal area was located.72 In February of 1989, the
plaintiff submitted an application for authority to accept out-of-state
waste at its landfill.73 After the planning committee denied the
application, the plaintiff commenced an action challenging the

64. Id. at 341.
65. 112 S.Ct. 2019 (1992).
66. Id. at 2021.
67. Id. at 2022.
68. Id. at 2028.
69. Id. at 2021-22.
70. Id. at 2022.
71. Id. at 2022.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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restrictions.74
The Supreme Court held that the Michigan statute violated the
Commerce Clause.75 Although the waste import restrictions, unlike the
prohi itions in City of Philadelphia,did not discriminate against
interstate commerce on their face or in effect because they treated waste
from other Michigan counties no differently from waste from other
states, the Court held that a "[s]tate (or one of its political subdivisions)
may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State,
rather than through the State itself. '7 6 With this holding, the Court
eliminated another mechanism by which a state could attempt to limit
the amount of municipal solid waste that entered its borders. As it did
in City of Philadelphia,however, the Court in Fort GratiotLandfill
suggested that import restrictions may be permissible for publicly
owned landfills. 77 Thus, public control of solid waste landfills,
coupled with the enactment of the market participant exception, may be
a state's best hope to protect the health, safety, and economic concerns
of its citizens.
III. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCrRINE

The Supreme Court has held that when a state enters the market
as a purchaser or seller of interstate commerce, nothing in the dormant
Commerce Clause forbids it from restricting its own purchases or
limiting its sales to its own citizens.7 The Court has determined that
a state or local government is not subject to the restrictions of the
Commerce Clause when it acts as a market participant as opposed to a
market regulator.79 In the absence of congressional action, nothing in

74. Id.

75. Id. at 2028.
76. Id. at 2109.
77. Id. at 2027 n.7.
78. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (5 to 4 decision holding
that state bounty for scrap automobiles can favor scrap processors with an in-state plant).
79. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983);
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). The Court in Reeves referred to market-participant
action as "state proprietary activity." Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. Recent legislative
proposals by states have applied the market participant exception under the guise of
state planning. If a state or its subdivision acts as a market participant rather than a
market regulator the Commerce Clause does not "require independent justification" for
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the Commerce Clause prohibits a state from participating in the market
and thereby favoring its own citizens over others.' 0 Policy
considerations of state sovereignty,"' the role of each state "as guardian
and trustee" for its people, 2 fairness, 3 and the fact that a state, like a
private business, should not be governed by the Commerce Clause when
it enters the private market encourage judicial restraint in this area."
The market participant doctrine represents an exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause and swallows the rule developed in City of
Philadelphiathat prohibits solid waste restrictive statutes.
A. Origins of the Doctrine
The public/private distinction became important in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence just two years before the Supreme Court decided
City of Philadelphia. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 5 the
Court sustained a scheme whereby the State of Maryland purchased
crushed automobile hulks above the market price, in order to help rid
the state of abandoned cars." This scheme operated in such a way
that, as a practical matter, Maryland refused to buy hulks from out-ofstate scrap processors.8 Virginia processors claimed that this plan
violated the Commerce Clause. 8 The Court disagreed and held that
Commerce Clause analysis was inapplicable. 9 Maryland was not
regulating the flow of hulks, but rather had "entered into the market
itself" in order to raise the price of hulks.' The Court discerned
nothing in the Commerce Clause that barred a state, "in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the

any protectionist measure. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809.
80. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 810.
81. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. at 438.
82. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).

83. See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446 (reversal would discourage similar state projects
because of the fear that other states would reap the benefits of its foresight, risk, and
industry).
84. Id. at 438-39 (quoting U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
85. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
86. Id. at 796.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 802.
89. Id. at 809.
90. Id. at 810.
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right to favor its own citizens over others." 91 The Hughes decision
immunized from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny situations where a
state acts solely as a market participant, rather than as a market
regulator.
The theory that when governments act as market participants
their actions are not subject to dormant Commerce Clause restrictions
also appeared in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers.92 The Court upheld an order by the mayor of Boston that
all construction projects funded by city monies must be "performed by a
work force consisting of at least half bona fide residents of Boston." 93
In the Court's view, where the government acts as market participant
rather than regulator, the Commerce Clause simply does not apply; thus
the impact on out-of-state residents is irrelevant, as is the fact that the
governmental action may be broader than necessary to accomplish its
objectives.'
B. The Doctrine and the Natural Resources Exception
Since Hughes, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the market
participant doctrine five times, solidifying the concept. 95 In Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake,96 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld the right of a state
owned cement plant to favor in-state customers in times of shortage.
The majority dismissed the argument that such a ruling permitted the
state to hoard its resources of cement. 97 The majority asserted that
"[c]ement is not a natural resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or
minerals... [but] is the end-product of a complex process whereby a
costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials." 8 The
Court's rationale distinguished cement from raw materials and
developed a natural resources exception to the market participant
doctrine. 99 In the past, cases involving states' legislative attempts to
91. Id.

92. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
93. Id. at 206.
94. Id. at 210.

95. For lower court decisions applying the market participant exemption outside the
waste import area, see County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 18 n.4 (Md. Ct.
App. 1984).
96. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
97. Id. at 443.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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hoard natural resources have reached the Supreme Court, and in every
instance the Court has struck down these efforts. 1°°
The Supreme Court applied the natural resources exception in
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke'01 when it
reviewed an Alaska statute regulating the sale of timber owned by the
state. 1' According to the statute, all proposed contracts for sale of
the timber would require that the "primary manufacture" of the timber
take place within the state."0 3 One who successfully bid to purchase
timber was required to process it within Alaska by converting the logs
into slabs or cants before shipping it out of state."°
The Court concluded that the market participant doctrine did not
apply, and held that the regulation violated the Commerce Clause.10 5
The Court distinguished South-Central Timber from Reeves, noting two
important differences. First, the timber was a natural resource, whereas
the cement in Reeves was the end product of a long manufacturing
process involving much labor and capital. 1" Second, the burdens on
commerce in South-Central Timber affected more than those involved in
the immediate transaction within the state, because the terms imposed
by the state prevented the buyer from selling logs to an out-of-state
buyer unless they had first been processed in-state."°7 The Court held
that the market participant doctrine will apply only where the effects of
the state's terms are limited to the particular market in which the state
is participating. 0 8 In South-Central Timber the state was engaging in
downstream regulation of the timber processing market' 9 and,
therefore, was not entitled to the market participant exception.
Significantly, by enacting restrictive statutes, Alaska was
attempting to develop a local timber industry. The State could have
utilized alternative methods such as requiring Alaska to sell its timber
exclusively to companies that maintained active primary-processing

100. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Pennsylvania v.

West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas).
101. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).

102. Id. at 84 n.1.
103. Id.
104. Id. 85 n.2(a).

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 95.
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plants in Alaska, or having the State directly subsidize the primary
processing industry within the state.11° Justice Rehnquist, in his
dissent, argued that because these alternatives were constitutional, the
Court's ruling was "unduly formalistic.""'
The Court in both Reeves and South-Central Timber suggested
that natural resources may be an exception to the rule that a state may
freely choose its customers. If the market participant doctrine provides
for a natural resources exception, then courts will face the difficult task
of determining what is or is not a natural resource.
The Court has implied that a state, consistent with the
12
Commerce Clause, may restrict access to state owned resources,'
thereby rejecting the application of the natural resources doctrine to
public solid waste landfills. The Court in City of Philadelphiadid state,
however, that the New Jersey law "impose[d] on out-of-state
commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining
landfill space. ' In this context the Supreme Court suggested that
landfill sites were natural resources, and as support for this proposition,
referred to earlier holdings that states may not prohibit nonresident
access to privately owned resources found within the state. 4
Assuming that land suitable for landfills would be a natural resource
which a state would not be permitted to amass, some courts have held
that solid waste restrictive statutes did not allow the states to hoard land
located within their territorial limits; instead, the statutes have attempted
to "preserve for [the state's] residents the benefits from a service
provided by a costly facility constructed and operated with tax revenues
collected from [the state's] own citizens.""' 5 This service provided by
local governments is "the end product of a complex process whereby a
' 6
costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials." "
III. WASTE IMPORT BANS: VICTORY FOR THE MARKET PARTICIPANT

DOCTRINE

110. Id. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 103.
112. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978).

113. Id.
114. Id. at 627.

115. County Comm'rs of Charles County, Maryland v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 20 (Md.

1984).
116. Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980)).
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When the state itself acts as a merchant or customer, the
Commerce Clause pro tanto does not apply. 1 7 Moreover, the
exemption's applicability does not depend on whether the state or local
government acts in a traditional governmental role, or instead enters a
private market to operate a commercial venture. The majority in City of
Philadelphiastated that a state or local government, consistent with the
Commerce Clause, can restrict disposal of out-of-jurisdiction trash at
landfills owned by the government. 8 This decision is important
because eighty percent of the landfills receiving municipal solid waste
in the United States are state or locally owned." 9 However, the
Supreme Court has yet to address specifically how the market
participant exemption applies to state and local measures discouraging
the import of out-of-jurisdiction waste. That task has fallen to the lower
courts.
120

LaFrancoisv. Rhode Island

The state of Rhode Island enacted several statutes that imposed
criminal sanctions upon any individual found dumping out-of-state
waste at the state-subsidized Central Landfill in Rhode Island. 21 The
Central Landfill was the sole Rhode Island disposal site for all
categories of nonhazardous solid waste. 22 The plaintiff, a commercial
handler of solid waste, alleged that the statutory provisions violated the
Commerce Clause.1 23 The defendant, Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corporation ("RISWMC"), was "a legislatively created
public agency formed in 1974 in order to plan, construct, operate and
maintain a statewide system of solid waste management facilities and
services."'12 In 1980, RISWMC purchased the Central Landfill from

117. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).

118. 437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
119. Environmental Protection Agency [RCRA] Subtitle D Study: Phase I Report table
4-2 (1986). Of the approximately 9,000 landfills known to be receiving municipal waste,
77.9 percent are owned by local government, 1.4 percent by state government, and 3.9
percent by the federal government. Privately owned landfills make up the remaining 16.7
percent.
120. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
121. Id. at 1206.
122. Id. at 1205.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 1206.
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5

A public agency operated the Central Landfill and the State
contributed to the landfill's funding. Consequently, the district court
held that the public character of Central Landfill exempted the state's
action from the restraints of the Commerce Clause pursuant to the
1 26
reservation expressed in footnote six of City of Philadelphia.

County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens"r
The County Commissioners of Charles County owned and
12
operated a sanitary landfill in Pisgah, Charles County, Maryland. 1
The purpose of the facility was to provide for the disposal of solid
waste generated by Charles County residents.1 29 The Pisgah facility
was the only sanitary landfill in Charles County, and County tax
revenue provided the primary funding for operation of the landfill. 3 °
Pursuant to their statutory authority, the County Commissioners adopted
a regulation that prohibited disposal of waste generated outside of the
County in the County landfill. 3 ' The regulation governed only public
landfills and had no application to any privately owned facility.'32
Stevens operated a solid waste hauling business within and
beyond the territorial limits of Charles County.'33 Stevens' trucks
dumped refuse collected outside of Charles County at the Pisgah
site."M When the County suspended his permit for violating the
statute,'35 Stevens filed suit complaining that the regulation
36
contravened the Commerce Clause.

125. Id. at 1206.
126. Id. at 1208.
127. 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984).
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Regulations Governing the Use of Charles County Public Trash Disposal Areas,
Regulation 4(d): "No garbage, trash, or refuse collected outside the territorial limits of
Charles County shall be disposed of in any Public Trash Disposal Area of Charles
County." County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 13-14 (Md.
1984).
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 14.
136. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Charles County was
acting as a market participant and that the Commerce Clause did not
apply to its activities. 37 The court reasoned that the County neither
bought nor sold refuse deposited in the landfill, but that it provided a
service to private waste haulers. 38 Because Charles County
constructed the landfill to accommodate the waste generated in the
County, the restrictions merely limited the benefits of the service to the
County taxpayers who paid for the landfill. 139 The Maryland appellate
court regarded its decision as "good sense and sound policy,"'"4 and
affirmed the proposition that a state may limit "benefits generated by a
state program to those 4who fund the state treasury and whom the State
was created to serve.' 1
The court acknowledged the "common market" purpose of the
Commerce Clause, yet emphasized that the United States is a "federal
union of sovereign states in which local governments are given primary
responsibility for providing many of the services that the public relies
upon .... 1142 "The power of local governments to serve their
citizens need not yield in every instance to the desire for national
uniformity. ,143
Shayne Brothers, Inc. v. Districtof Columbia'"
Shayne Brothers involved a corporation engaged in the business
of trash removal in and around the District of Columbia. 45 Shayne
Brothers held a solid waste collector's license from the District, and a
significant portion of its trucks were licensed to operate in the District
of Columbia."" The defendant, operated three solid waste
landfills. 147 No private landfills existed in the city. 4 The District
had enacted legislation that prohibited delivering solid wastes generated

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21.
Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980)).
Id. at 22.
Id.
592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984).
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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outside of the city to any of the disposal facilities unless prior
arrangements had been made with the Commissioner.14 9
The controversy arose when the District barred one of Shayne
Brothers' trucks from using the city's landfills as a penalty for
importing waste from Maryland. i" ° Shayne Brothers filed suit
asserting that the District's regulation imposed an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce.15 ' The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that the statute did not violate the
Commerce Clause. 52 "[The fact that the District has accomplished
by an ordinance what it might have done by contract (or, for that
matter, by simply exercising its landowner's prerogative to bar entry)
does not alter the essence of its act.'0 53 Because the District
expended a public resource, similar to providing the services of police
or teachers, the regulation did nothing more than limit the benefits of
the waste disposal service to the County taxpayers who paid for it.15
This result is in harmony with the holding in Charles County.
IV. CONCLUSION
Millions of tons of garbage cross state lines each year, 15 5 and
states have attempted to use their regulatory powers to stop the flow of
waste imported into their landfills in order to accommodate their own
solid waste. This Article has demonstrated that publicly owned and
operated landfills have provided the necessary means by which state
legislatures have enacted and enforced out-of-state waste import
restrictions.
The threat of a Commerce Clause challenge to regulatory efforts
has created a significant deterrent to aggressive state solid waste
management. Although constitutional considerations have restricted
legislation significantly, the Commerce Clause has not presented an
insurmountable hurdle for waste management planning. The market
participant doctrine provides the courts with a compromise that permits
states to implement waste import restrictions without violating the

149. Id. at 1130.
150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1134.
153. Id. at 1133-34.
154. Id. at 1134.
155. Shipping Out the Trash, supra note 5, at 28.
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Commerce Clause.
The market participant exception allows states to restrict the
importation of out-of-state garbage while avoiding scrutiny under the
dormant Commerce Clause. By avoiding such scrutiny, market
participants restrict out-of-state waste without fear that other states will
use Commerce Clause freedom to export waste for disposal into their
landfills. The case law demonstrates that a state or local government
can become a market participant by purchasing or building waste
disposal facilities that provide a waste processing service for its citizens.
Many are willing to generate waste, yet few are willing to help
dispose of it. Locales that provide disposal capacity to handle foreign
waste effectively reduce safety risks to the states that will not take
charge of their own waste. In this way, the market participant
exception for waste import restrictions embraces the common sense
notion that those responsible for a problem should be responsible for its
solution.

